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Abstract 18 
 19 
Imitation and perspective taking are core features of non-verbal social interactions. We imitate 20 
one another to signal a desire to affiliate and consider others’ points of view to better 21 
understand their perspective. Prior research suggests that a relationship exists between 22 
prosocial behaviour and imitation. For example, priming prosocial behaviours has been shown 23 
to increase imitative tendencies in automatic imitation tasks. Despite its importance during 24 
social interactions, far less is known about how perspective taking might relate to either 25 
prosociality or imitation. The current study investigates the relationship between automatic 26 
imitation and perspective taking by testing the extent to which these skills are similarly 27 
modulated by prosocial priming. Across all experimental groups, a surprising ceiling effect 28 
 2 
emerged in the perspective taking task (the Director’s Task), which prevented the investigation 29 
of prosocial priming on perspective taking. A comparison of other studies using the Director’s 30 
Task shows wide variability in accuracy scores across studies and is suggestive of low task 31 
reliability. In addition, despite using a high-power design, and contrary to three previous 32 
studies, no effect of prosocial prime on imitation was observed. Meta-analysing all studies to 33 
date suggests that the effects of prosocial primes on imitation are variable and could be small. 34 
The current study, therefore, offers caution when using the computerised Director’s Task as a 35 
measure of perspective taking with adult populations, as it shows high variability across studies 36 
and may suffer from a ceiling effect. In addition, the results question the size and robustness 37 
of prosocial priming effects on automatic imitation. More generally, by reporting null results 38 
we hope to minimise publication bias and by meta-analysing results as studies emerge and 39 
making data freely available, we hope to move towards a more cumulative science of social 40 
cognition.   41 
 42 
Introduction 43 
Social interactions involve a number of cognitive processes and behaviours, including imitation 44 
and perspective taking. While both of these social skills have been studied extensively in 45 
isolation, the relationship between imitation and perspective taking has received less attention. 46 
In addition, although social context can modulate imitation [1, 2, 3] much less is known 47 
regarding potential influences on perspective taking. A better understanding of how context 48 
can affect perspective taking skills may not only help to elucidate the relationship between 49 
various interacting social processes but also provide insight into how real-world social 50 
interaction skills could be enhanced. The current study considers this issue by testing the extent 51 
to which imitation and perspective taking are similarly modulated by prosocial priming.  52 
 3 
 Automatic imitation is a common occurrence during social encounters, and involves 53 
spontaneous copying of others’ actions and gestures [4]. Mimicry is a form of automatic 54 
imitation that is typically studied in social contexts using overt copying behaviours and facial 55 
movements. In contrast, other measures of automatic imitation have been developed using 56 
stimulus-response compatibility (SRC) paradigms to provide a reaction time signature of 57 
automatic imitation (see [2, 5, 6] for reviews). Although imitative behaviour rarely reaches 58 
conscious awareness for either interaction partner, it subconsciously signals a desire to affiliate 59 
and build rapport [7]. For example, people who are imitated are bigger tippers [8], donate more 60 
to charity [9], engage in prosocial behaviours [9, 10, 11,12] and indicate liking people who 61 
imitate them more than those that do not [8]. Clearly, then, imitation can play an important role 62 
in guiding social interactions. To clarify the role imitation can play across different social 63 
contexts, recent research has started to identify its antecedents [1, 2]. For example, prosocial 64 
priming can increase imitative behaviour [1]. Thus, there exists a bi-directional relationship 65 
between imitation and prosociality; those who are imitated behave more prosocially and those 66 
who are prosocially primed imitate more. Studies investigating automatic imitation and 67 
prosocial behaviour have primarily employed observational techniques to study imitation, with 68 
the measurement being the frequency of observed copying behaviours during live social 69 
interaction. 70 
The reaction time based automatic imitation task [13, 14] is an example of a stimulus-71 
response compatibility paradigm, referring to the fact that people cannot help but be affected 72 
by the presence of an irrelevant stimulus feature [15, 16]. In one well-established automatic 73 
imitation task, individuals are instructed to respond to a number cue by lifting their index or 74 
middle finger. Concurrently, participants either observe a congruent or incongruent finger 75 
movement. Reactions times (RT) are longer in the incongruent compared to congruent 76 
condition and this difference is thought to signify the cost of inhibiting an imitative response 77 
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[1, 17]. Here, then, imitation is captured as the time it takes to suppress the urge to copy an 78 
observed action and prioritise one’s own action. The tendency towards imitation (incongruent 79 
RT less congruent RT) will hereafter be referred to as the congruency effect.  80 
A handful of studies have explored the effects of prosocial priming on automatic 81 
imitation [18, 19, 20]. Priming is thought to operate by subtly triggering a goal that 82 
unconsciously guides behaviour [21]. These studies used semantic primes (scrambled 83 
sentences) of a prosocial nature to create a goal to behave in a prosocial manner [22].  The 84 
logic being that a goal to affiliate and work well with others would be achieved by increasing 85 
the tendency to imitate [18]. Despite using slightly different variants of the automatic imitation 86 
task and different experimental designs, each study reported an effect of prosocial priming on 87 
automatic imitation; priming increased the congruency effect. More specifically, the prosocial 88 
prime had to be self-related to increase imitation (e.g., ‘I am prosocial’); when using third 89 
person primes (e.g., ‘Alex is prosocial’) the congruency effect did not differ from controls [18]. 90 
These results suggest that a specific type of social prime can modulate automatic imitation; 91 
when individuals are personally primed to be prosocial, people find it harder to suppress their 92 
imitative tendencies.  93 
Like imitation, accurate representation of another’s perspective is inherently 94 
intertwined with successful social interactions. Perspective taking has been shown to correlate 95 
with social competence [23] and successful communication requires both the ability to 96 
understand an interaction partner’s viewpoint and the ability to separate our own knowledge or 97 
beliefs from that point of view [24]. Perspective taking takes many forms, with visual 98 
perspective taking referring to situations where one must evaluate what someone else sees or 99 
how they see the environment [25]. Typically, individuals adopt an egocentric bias during 100 
social interactions, such that their own view is prioritised relative to others’ viewpoints [ 26, 101 
27, 28].  102 
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Unsurprisingly, such egocentrism can interfere with judgements about others’ 103 
perspectives [29, 30, 31, 32]. The Director’s Task [30, 31] requires participants to follow the 104 
instructions of another, the “Director”. In this task, a set of shelves, comprising sixteen slots, 105 
stand between the Director and a participant. The slots house a variety of familiar items (for 106 
example keys and cups), some of which are present in multiples of three and vary in size, and 107 
all of which were visible to the participant. However, a number of slots have a backing, such 108 
that any objects they contain are occluded from the Director’s view. The Director selects 109 
objects for the participant to remove from the shelves. On critical trials, the Director is not able 110 
to see the object that matches the description according to the participant’s view and it is on 111 
these trials that participants are required to deduce the item to which the Director is referring 112 
(e.g. select the second largest cup if the actual largest cup is not visible to the Director). The 113 
task indexes perspective taking by measuring the number of egocentric errors participants make 114 
when there is a conflict between their and the Director’s perspectives. Even when it is made 115 
explicitly clear that the Director cannot not see the same objects that the participants can see, 116 
egocentric errors are still made [31]. This suggests that while people may be capable of seeing 117 
things from another’s point of view, they do not always do so, with people often presuming 118 
another’s perspective is the same as their own [27, 28]. As Gillespie and Richardson [28] put 119 
it; “although perspective taking is central to social life, people are not particularly good at it”. 120 
Identifying ways of improving its application should, therefore, enhance social interactions. 121 
Although visual perspective taking has been studied extensively, how social context 122 
influences visual perspective taking and how visual perspective taking relates to other 123 
dimensions of social cognition, such as automatic imitation, have not been studied to date. 124 
Further, there is reason to suggest that automatic imitation and visual perspective taking may, 125 
in part, rely on a shared cognitive mechanism that distinguishes self from other. To succeed in 126 
automatic imitation tasks, a person must suppress the other’s action and promote their own. 127 
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Conversely, for visual perspective taking, a person must suppress their own knowledge or 128 
belief and enhance the other’s perspective. Success at both tasks, then, requires a person to be 129 
able to quickly and flexibly distinguish between themselves and another. This is known as the 130 
‘self-other distinction’ (see [33]). One study has directly addressed whether automatic imitation 131 
and visual perspective taking rely on a partially shared mechanism. Santiesteban and 132 
colleagues [34] found that training on a task that required a self-other distinction (imitation 133 
inhibition) transferred to a different self-other task; the Director’s Task. Even though automatic 134 
imitation and visual perspective taking may rely on a common mechanism, no research to date 135 
has shown that social context influences automatic imitation and visual perspective taking in a 136 
similar manner.  137 
The current study, therefore, has three aims. First, drawing from studies exploring the 138 
effects of prosocial priming on automatic imitation, we will investigate the effects of prosocial 139 
priming on visual perspective taking. Does activating a goal to affiliate enhance one’s ability 140 
to readily adopt another’s visual perspective? Second, we will explore whether visual 141 
perspective taking and automatic imitation are correlated following prosocial priming. Does 142 
prosocial priming affect them in a similar manner? Third, we will perform a conceptual 143 
replication of previous studies, which showed an effect of first person, prosocial priming on 144 
automatic imitation [18, 19, 20]. Does activating a goal to affiliate increase automatic imitation 145 
in a subsequent RT task? Previous studies exploring this question have been conceptual 146 
replications of one another. While each used a different automatic imitation task, they all 147 
targeted and found the same main effect, indicating that the specific SRC task is not critical to 148 
the success of the prime. In addition, an effect was found irrespective of whether designs were 149 
within-subject [18] or between-subjects [19, 20] designs. Here then, a conceptual replication 150 
refers to studies using the same priming procedure to target the same effect while deviating on 151 
the precise automatic imitation task employed.   152 
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To test visual perspective taking abilities, we will use the Director’s Task [30, 31].  We 153 
will include both first person and third person prime conditions, to test whether self-relatedness 154 
influences prosocial priming of visual perspective taking in the same way as automatic 155 
imitation. Firstly, we predict that prosocially primed groups will achieve higher accuracy on 156 
the Director’s Task as compared to controls. Secondly, we predict that first person, prosocial 157 
priming will produce a positive correlation between visual perspective taking accuracy and 158 
larger congruency effects from the automatic imitation task. Finally, in line with previous 159 
findings, we expect that first person, prosocial priming will produce a larger congruency effect 160 
than both third person and control conditions. Together, these results will test the extent to 161 
which social context influences automatic imitation and visual perspective taking in a similar 162 
manner and therefore provide insight into the extent to which these core social abilities rely on 163 
a shared cognitive mechanism.  164 
 165 
 166 
Method 167 
 168 
Participants  169 
Data from 153 individuals (111 female, mean age = 20.9, SD = 3.8, range 18-41) were 170 
collected in return for course credit; with 52 in the first person, prosocial (PS-1st) group, 52 in 171 
third person, prosocial (PS-3rd) and 49 controls. Ages ranged from 18 to 41 with average ages 172 
of 21.58 (SD 5.2) for PS-1st, 20.42 (SD 3.0) for PS-3rd and 20.71 (SD 2.4) for the control group. 173 
Ethical approval was granted by the Research Ethics and Governance Committee of the School 174 
of Psychology at Bangor University. All participants gave their explicit informed consent and 175 
were free to withdraw from the study at any time. 176 
 177 
Sample Size & Power Calculation 178 
 8 
No previous studies have explored the influence of prosocial priming on visual 179 
perspective taking, which means the expected effect size cannot be estimated from such data. 180 
Instead, the difference in congruency effects found by previous studies researching prosocial 181 
priming and automatic imitation was used to determine our sample size. These prior studies 182 
found medium to large effects (Cohen’s d of 0.53 - 0.75). However, evidence would suggest 183 
that published studies overestimate effect sizes [35, 36]. With this in mind, we powered our 184 
study to detect effect sizes at the lowest range of those found previously [37].  A sensitivity 185 
analysis in G*Power [38] using a one-tailed test, based on a mean difference between two 186 
independent groups (PS-1st and control), with an alpha of .05 and 80% power to detect a 187 
medium effect size (Cohen’s d=0.5) or larger, returned a sample size of 50 participants per 188 
group. Therefore, we aimed to test 150 participants (50 per group) making our sample size 189 
much larger than previous studies. 190 
 191 
Procedure and Stimuli 192 
Prior to testing, participants were told they were taking part in a study investigating 193 
people’s accuracy rates and reaction time across three types of tasks. Testing was performed 194 
in one session, lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants were randomly assigned to a 195 
group; first person prosocial (PS-1ST), third person prosocial (PS-3RD) or control. The order of 196 
tasks was kept the same for all participants (see Fig 1 below). 197 
 198 
Fig 1: Order of tasks 199 
 200 
As our primary task of interest was the perspective taking task, we did not counterbalance the 201 
Director’s Task with the automatic imitation task as we did not want any effects of imitation 202 
to confound any effects on perspective taking. Moreover, the Director’s task takes only 203 
around four minutes to complete (whereas the automatic imitation task takes over double 204 
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that) meaning any effects of priming should survive the procedure and goal priming is 205 
thought to have a reasonably slow rate of decay [22].   206 
 207 
Demographics & Questionnaires 208 
Prior to priming, each participant completed a brief demographics information sheet 209 
(age, gender, handedness and first language) together with three previously validated 210 
questionnaires; the Short Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ-10 Adult) questionnaire [39], a self-211 
esteem questionnaire [40] and the interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) [23]. Questionnaire data 212 
was collected for another study and is not discussed here. For completeness, the results are 213 
provided in supplementary materials (S1 Table). 214 
 215 
Prosocial Priming Stimuli 216 
Prosocial priming was implemented through a scrambled sentences task [41] using 217 
sentence stimuli previously used to study automatic imitation [e.g. 18]. Three booklets, each 218 
containing 20 sentences, were used and each participant received only one booklet; either PS-219 
1ST, PS-3rd or the non-social control. Taking around 10-15 minutes, the task consisted of 220 
partially completed sentences with a list of words above them, with one word being irrelevant. 221 
Participants were instructed to select the correct words to write a grammatically correct 222 
sentence. PS-1st and PS-3rd sentences contained words such as together, collaborate, 223 
affectionate, share and help, which were designed to drive a prosocial attitude towards the self 224 
or the other respectively. All PS-1st sentences started with ‘I’ whereas PS-3rd used other people 225 
such that it was another person performing the prosocial act. For example, a completed first 226 
person, prosocial sentence might read “I always comfort my friends when they are upset” 227 
whereas the same sentence in the third person would read “David always comforts his friends 228 
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when they are upset”. To produce a neutral attitude, control sentences were purely factual (e.g., 229 
“London is the capital of England”).  230 
 231 
Visual Perspective Taking  232 
Following priming, the Director’s Task was administered. We used a computerized 233 
version of the Director’s Task [42], originally designed by Keysar and colleagues [30, 31]. The 234 
specific stimuli that we used were kindly shared with us by Dumontheil and colleagues [43]. 235 
Displayed on screen was a picture of a block of shelves (4x4 configuration) housing a number 236 
of recognisable objects, all of which were visible to the participant. Some shelves had a back 237 
on them such that anyone standing on the other side could not see the items in those slots. A 238 
person (the “Director”) was positioned on the other side of the shelves. The Director would 239 
issue an instruction (e.g. “Move the mouse down”) which the participant was required to follow 240 
by selecting the named object with the mouse and dragging it to the appropriate slot. Three 241 
practice trials were presented prior to the test beginning. Participants were explicitly made 242 
aware of the backing on some shelves and told that someone on the other side would not be 243 
able to see all of the items.  244 
 For the main task, there were 48 trials in total; 32 control trials (one object, visible to 245 
both participant and director, see Fig 2A), 8 non-conflict (NC) trials (more than one object of 246 
varying size, all visible to both participant and Director) and 8 conflict/experimental trials 247 
(more than one object of varying size, all visible to the participant but not all visible to the 248 
Director). To be correct on an experimental trial, the participant had to identify and move the 249 
object to which the Director was referring (see Fig 2B). Trials were presented in blocks of three 250 
with participants only being given a short amount of time to respond before the next trial would 251 
automatically begin. The task was presented by ePrime version 2 and lasted for around four 252 
minutes. 253 
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Fig 2: An example of a control trial (one item) in the Director’s task (“Move the 254 
mouse down”) (A) and an experimental trial in the Director’s task (“Move the small 255 
dice up”) (B) 256 
 257 
Automatic Imitation Task  258 
Next, participants completed the automatic imitation task, based on the task designed 259 
by Brass and colleagues [13, 14]. Instructions were provided orally by the experimenter as well 260 
as in written form at the beginning of the task. At the start of each trial, participants were 261 
instructed to keep their index and middle fingers of their right hand pressed down on keys n 262 
and m respectively. Prior to each trial onset, the screen displayed a small fixation cross in the 263 
centre of the screen for 500ms. The image of a hand in a neutral position would then appear. 264 
Participants were instructed to raise their index finger when the number ‘1’ appeared on screen. 265 
When the number ‘2’ appeared, they were to raise their middle finger. Instructions were to 266 
respond as fast and as accurately as possible. To be correct on a trial, participants had to raise 267 
the finger that matched the number; index for ‘1’, middle for ‘2’. At the same time as the 268 
number appeared, the hand in the background would raise either its index or middle finger. For 269 
congruent trials, the stimulus hand would raise the same finger as the participant. For 270 
incongruent trials, the stimulus hand would raise a different finger to the participant (Fig 3). 271 
  272 
Fig 3: An example of a CONGRUENT (left) and INCONGRUENT (right) trial in the 273 
automatic imitation task 274 
  275 
Data for 32 practice trials was collected prior to priming but not analysed. In the main 276 
task, there were 128 experimental trials in total, displayed in a random order, comprising 64 277 
congruent trials (32 index and 32 middle) and 64 incongruent trials (32 index and 32 middle). 278 
Trials were presented in four blocks of 32 trials with an opportunity for a break being provided 279 
between each block. The task took around eight minutes to complete in total. In order to prevent 280 
participants from anticipating when the stimulus would appear, inter-stimulus intervals of 500, 281 
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700 and 1,000 milliseconds were randomly applied to the neutral hand before the next image 282 
appeared. The image of the hand and number would remain on screen until the participant lifted 283 
their finger or after 2,000ms, whichever came first, before returning to the fixation cross. The 284 
task was written in Matlab and presented using Psychophysics Toolbox.  285 
 286 
Following completion of all tasks, participants were debriefed on the nature of the 287 
experiment. When asked, no participants reported guessing what the experiment was 288 
investigating and all were unaware that the scrambled sentences were trying to prime a 289 
prosocial attitude. 290 
 291 
Data analysis  292 
Visual Perspective Taking task – The Director’s task 293 
In the version of the director’s task that we used, we anticipated that reaction time 294 
would not be an instructive measure. With no fixed starting point for the mouse at the beginning 295 
of each trial, participants would not have necessarily all started in the same place. As such, 296 
reaction time did not solely index the length of mental processing time; it also indexed the 297 
distance the mouse had to travel to select the correct item. Further, participants could freely 298 
move the mouse during the instruction phase, meaning some could place the cursor over an 299 
object before the instruction had finished while others might have waited until they had heard 300 
the whole request before moving. For these reasons, we considered accuracy data to be our 301 
primary measure of interest.  302 
The accuracy of performance as a function of trial type and group was analysed. For 303 
each trial, participants could be correct, wrong or not answer (omit). Overall accuracy, based 304 
on correct responses for all 48 trials, was calculated for each participant. The mean accuracy 305 
and SD of each group was calculated. To control for outliers, participants with an average 306 
accuracy of less than three SD from their group’s mean were removed from their group. This 307 
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resulted in seven participants being removed in total (PS-1st: 2; PS-3rd: 3; and Control: 2) and 308 
146 being taken forward for analysis. For completeness, we also ran the analysis without 309 
removing outliers; no differences were noted. Independent analysis of variance tests 310 
(ANOVAs) were used to explore differences in accuracy across the experimental groups. 311 
 312 
Automatic Imitation Task  313 
In the automatic imitation task, reaction time was measured as the time taken from the 314 
appearance of the imperative cue (“1” or “2”) to when the finger was released. Trials were 315 
defined as accurate if the finger lifted matched the target number cue and incorrect if there was 316 
a mismatch between finger movement and target number cue. All incorrect responses were 317 
removed prior to analysis (<4% congruent trials and <10% of incongruent trials). Trials with a 318 
reaction time of less than 250ms or more than 2,000ms were also removed (<.1% of overall 319 
trials) as these were suggestive of expectancy errors and lapses in attention, respectively.  Data 320 
for index and middle finger responses were collapsed. Accuracy and reaction time were 321 
calculated for each participant for each trial type; congruent and incongruent. Participants’ 322 
congruency effects were calculated by subtracting congruent reaction time from incongruent 323 
reaction time.  324 
Outliers were considered in the context of both the individual (deviation from their own 325 
mean) and their group (deviation from the group mean). At participant level, trials falling 326 
outside of three SD either side of their mean reaction time were removed. Reaction time and 327 
accuracy for each participant was recalculated and taken forward into the group calculations. 328 
Group reaction time and accuracy means were then calculated and participants falling outside 329 
of three SD of their group’s mean (for either reaction time or accuracy) were removed from 330 
further analysis. This resulted in six participants (PS-1ST: 1; PS-3RD: 1; and control: 4) being 331 
removed from further analysis and 147 being taken forward. ANOVAs were used to test for 332 
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differences in accuracy, reaction times and congruency effects across the experimental groups. 333 
To ensure that the removal of outliers did not affect the outcome of our results, analyses were 334 
repeated on the complete dataset. No differences were noted. 335 
 336 
 337 
Results 338 
 339 
Visual Perspective Taking Task 340 
 Accuracy for all trial types across all groups are reported in Table 1. Performance on 341 
the task was high across all groups, with average accuracy exceeding 90% for experimental 342 
trials (Fig 4). Errors on experimental trials were rare and trials that were omitted (left 343 
unanswered) were more common (Fig 5). This would suggest that, of the trials completed, there 344 
was a ceiling effect present in performance (117 participants scored 100%, 26 scored 87.5% 345 
and the remaining 10 scored 75% or less). Accuracy for control and experimental trials (conflict 346 
between participant’s and Director’s perspective) were compared between groups. Using group 347 
as the between subject’s factor, two one-way ANOVAs on trial type revealed no significant 348 
differences between groups for accuracy on control F(2,143)= 2.31, p=.103, np2=.031 or, more 349 
importantly, experimental (F(2,143)= 0.53, p=.587, np2=.007) trials.  350 
 351 
Table 1. Summary of accuracy (%) results from the Director’s Task. 352 
 Trial Type Overall 
 Control Experimental Accuracy 
PS-1st 99.3 (1.7) 97.3 (5.2) 97.7 (2.8) 
PS-3rd 98.5 (3.6) 97.2 (6.4) 97.6 (3.8) 
Control 97.8 (4.5) 95.7 (11.4) 96.3 (5.2) 
Mean accuracy (%) for control and experimental trials, together with overall accuracy, for 353 
each group are provided (sd in brackets) 354 
 355 
Fig 4: Accuracy (%) for control and experimental trials on the Director’s Task for 356 
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each group. Bars represent SEM 357 
 358 
Fig 5: Omissions (%) for control and experimental trials on the Director’s Task for 359 
each group. Bars represent SEM 360 
 361 
To be certain that we did not miss any potential group differences that might be more evident 362 
in RTs than in accuracy, the same analyses were performed on RTs for control and 363 
experimental trials. In line with accuracy data, there were no group differences in RTs for 364 
control (F(2,143)=  0.123, p=.884, np2=.002) or experimental (F(2,143)= 0.085, p=.919, 365 
np2=.001) trials (S1 Fig).  366 
  367 
Given the overall high accuracy across all groups, which is indicative of a ceiling effect, 368 
further analyses of the relationship between visual perspective taking and automatic imitation 369 
were not performed as they would not be instructive.  370 
 The Director’s task was used because many studies report substantial error rates when 371 
using it and, as such, a ceiling effect was not expected. Near perfect scores across all 372 
experimental groups in this study prompted a (non-exhaustive) review of studies using the 373 
same task with adult participants (S2 Table). The search revealed that the task returns a variety 374 
of results ranging from 54-88% accuracy. Worth noting is the fact that the task only includes 375 
eight experimental trials, thus this range translates to one to four errors. For instance, accuracy 376 
of 87.5% (7/8) would be achieved if only one mistake was made. 377 
 378 
Automatic Imitation task  379 
Mean reaction times for congruent and incongruent trials, as well as the congruency 380 
effect (CE) are reported in Table 2. As can be seen, participants were faster and more accurate 381 
on congruent trials (Figs 6 and 7). A repeated-measures ANOVA for RT was performed with 382 
trial type (congruent and incongruent) as the within-subjects factor and group (PS-1st, PS-3rd 383 
and control) as the between-subjects factor. There was a significant main effect of trial type 384 
 16 
F(1,144)=647.759, p<.001, ηp2=.818, with congruent trials being significantly faster than 385 
incongruent trials. There was also an unexpected significant effect of group F(2,144)=7.882, 386 
p=.001, ηp2=.099. RTs were collapsed across congruent and incongruent trials for each group 387 
to produce mean RTs. As a post-hoc exploratory analysis, these were compared using t-tests. 388 
These showed that the PS-3rd group was significantly faster than both the PS-1st t(100)=3.65, 389 
p<.001 and control t(94)=3.32, p=.001 groups (see Fig 6). There was no mean RT difference 390 
between the PS-1st and Control group t(94)=.004, p=.997. While intriguing, this effect was 391 
unexpected. We think it most likely to be a result of sampling error (i.e., people in the 3rd party 392 
group just happened to be faster across all conditions than the other groups), but it is possible 393 
that it is a genuine effect of our manipulation. Crucially, there was no interaction between 394 
congruency and group F(2,144)=0.943, p=.392, ηp2=.013 indicating there was no differential 395 
effect of priming on congruency between groups. 396 
 397 
Table 2. Summary of results from the automatic imitation task. 398 
 PS-1st PS-3rd Control 
 RT Accuracy RT Accuracy RT Accuracy 
Congruent Trials 411 (42) 96.58 
(2.9) 
382 (38) 96.09 
(3.6) 
414 (50) 96.44 
(3.7) 
Incongruent Trials 482 (59) 90.13 
(6.8) 
445 (54) 89.15 
(7.5) 
479 (63) 91.80 
(8.6) 
Congruency Effect 71 (29) N/A 63 (26) N/A 65 (39) N/A 
Reaction times (ms) and accuracy rates (%) for each trial type and the congruency effect 399 
(incongruent RT – incongruent RT) for each group (sd in brackets) 400 
 401 
 402 
Fig 6: Reaction times (ms) for the Automatic Imitation task for congruent and 403 
incongruent trials for each group. Bars represent SEM 404 
 405 
Fig 7: Accuracy rates (%) for the Automatic Imitation task for congruent and 406 
incongruent trials for each group. Bars represent SEM 407 
 408 
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A repeated-measures ANOVA for accuracy was performed with trial type (congruent and 409 
incongruent) as the within-subjects factor and group (PS-1st, PS-3rd and control) as the between-410 
subjects factor (Fig 7). There was a significant main effect of trial type F(1,144)=127.811, 411 
p<.001, ηp2=.470, with congruent trials being significantly more accurate than incongruent 412 
trials. Again, crucially, there was no accuracy*group interaction (F(2,144)= 1.660, p=.194, 413 
ηp2=.023). 414 
 415 
 416 
 As prior studies analysed the congruency effect [18, 19, 20] we carried out an 417 
independent one-way ANOVA on congruency effect as a function of group (Fig 8). There was 418 
no significant difference between the groups’ congruency effects F(2,144)=0.96, p=.387, 419 
ηp2=.013 . To ensure that the removal of outliers had not changed the results, we ran the same 420 
test with all participants (except for one who did not complete the task) included. The result 421 
was the same F(2,149)=1.24, p=.291, ηp2=.016. In addition, we wanted to ensure that English 422 
language proficiency did not impact priming effects. When removing non-native English 423 
speakers (N=29), there was still no effect of priming on imitation F(2,121)=1.2, p=.304. 424 
 425 
Fig 8: Congruency Effects (CE) – incongruent RT less congruent RT – for each 426 
group for the Automatic Imitation task. Bars represent SEM 427 
  428 
To provide quantitative evidence for the null hypothesis, a Bayesian analysis was 429 
performed [44] in JASP using the independent t-test function [45]. The returned Bayes factor 430 
BF01 provides an estimate of how likely the null hypothesis (0) is compared to the experimental 431 
hypothesis (1), given the data. A Bayes factor of 3.3 was returned. This suggests that the null 432 
hypothesis was three times more likely than the experimental hypothesis [46]. 433 
 434 
Meta-Analysis of automatic imitation results: PS-1st vs Control groups 435 
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To put our automatic imitation result in context, we performed a meta-analysis. The 436 
three previous studies using first person, prosocial priming (scrambled sentences) to investigate 437 
the effects on automatic imitation were included in the meta-analysis, along with the current 438 
study (Table 3). While these studies covered both within- [18] and between- [19, 20] subject 439 
designs and employed slightly different methods for testing automatic imitation, they shared 440 
sufficient similarity to be directly compared. All four studies used scrambled sentences to 441 
prime prosociality and measured imitation via an SRC index of automatic imitation. Therefore, 442 
while these studies are not direct replications of each other, they have substantial 443 
methodological similarity and all target the same primary effect, such that we consider them 444 
conceptual replications of each other. We meta-analysed the difference in congruency effect 445 
for first person priming compared to control. We were able to obtain raw data from one study 446 
[18]. In the absence of raw data for all studies, we used the values available from the published 447 
studies to compute standard deviations, standard errors and effect sizes. Cohen’s d [47] was 448 
calculated as the mean group difference divided by the pooled standard deviation.  449 
 450 
Table 3. Summary of studies included in the meta-analysis. 451 
Study 
 
Design Stimuli Sample 
/Group 
size 
PS-1st(2) 
CE 
Control 
(1) 
CE 
Effect Size (d) 
(2-1)/pooled sd 
Wang & 
Hamilton 
(2013) 
Within Fingers Spatial 16 28 (16) 16 (16) 0.75 
Cook & Bird 
(2011) 
Between Fingers Orthogonal 28 71 (63) 38 (37) 0.66 
Leighton et al 
(2010) 
Between Hands Spatial 12 38 (31) 26 (14) 0.53 
Current study Between Fingers Spatial 45-51* 71 (39) 65 (29) 0.18 
Mean congruency effects (CE) for PS-1st and control groups (sd in brackets) are used to 452 
calculate the standardised effect size (Cohen’s d). (* PS1st (51) and Control (45) were 453 
different sample sizes). Spatial stimuli introduce both a spatial and imitative component to 454 
the design. Orthogonal stimuli rotate the stimuli to reduce (but not remove) the spatial 455 
component. 456 
 457 
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The meta-analysis was performed using Exploratory Software for Confidence Intervals 458 
[48]. ESCI calculates a weighted contribution for each study based on sample size and variance, 459 
with larger sample sizes and smaller variance receiving the highest weighting. Based on 460 
Cumming’s recommendations [48], we used a random effects model to estimate the likely 461 
population effect size in original units (ms), as well as standardized units. 95% CIs are reported 462 
as a measure of precision for these population estimates. The results from these two 463 
calculations are reported here using forest plots (Fig 9). 464 
 465 
Fig 9: Forest plots of meta-analysis for Original units (ms) (A) and Standardised 466 
units (Cohen’s d) (B) 467 
Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. The random effects model indicates the 468 
likely population effect. 469 
 470 
 471 
 472 
The estimated difference in priming between first person and control is 11ms [95% CI 473 
4, 19] (Fig 9A). As can be seen from Fig 9A, two of the four studies in the MA have confidence 474 
intervals (CI) that cross over the zero line and the effect sizes range from 4 to 19ms. The 475 
standardized effect size is d=0.43 [0.15, 0.7] (Fig 9B), and varies across the four studies, with 476 
interval estimates touching or crossing zero in three of the studies. These results suggest that 477 
the effect is imprecise and it is possible that the true effect size may be close to zero. Prior to 478 
running this study, the cumulative effect size based on three prior studies was d=0.64. Adding 479 
the current study, which has a much larger sample size than all prior studies, reduces the 480 
cumulative effect size by a third to d=0.43 (Fig 9B).  481 
 482 
Open data 483 
To aid future meta-analyses and power estimates, data from the current experiment are 484 
available online for all dependent measures (osf.io/bseky). 485 
 486 
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 487 
Discussion 488 
 489 
Due to a ceiling effect using the Director’s Task, we were unable to investigate the effects of 490 
prosocial priming on visual perspective taking. A comparison of other studies using the 491 
Director’s Task shows wide variability in accuracy scores. Accordingly, we suggest that the 492 
reliability of the measure may be low and future research should test this formally. In addition, 493 
and contrary to previous studies and our expectations, we found no effect of prosocial priming 494 
on automatic imitation. To better understand this unexpected result, we performed a meta-495 
analysis of the effects of prosocial priming on automatic imitation. The result indicates that if 496 
a relationship does exist between prosocial priming and automatic imitation, it is likely smaller 497 
and more variable than the results of any one previous study would suggest. Therefore, we 498 
offer caution when using the Director’s Task as a measure of perspective taking and reduce the 499 
strength of evidence in favour of social priming modulating automatic imitation. More 500 
generally, the current study demonstrates the utility of replicating and meta-analysing main 501 
effects in an effort to build a more cumulative science of social cognition. 502 
 503 
Prosocial priming and Visual Perspective Taking  504 
We found an unexpected ceiling effect in the Director’s Task and, therefore, could not 505 
perform our primary analyses of interest. We reviewed published studies that have 506 
administered the Director’s Task to adults (over 18) and reported their accuracy rates (S2 507 
Table). This brief review found that the task returns a range of results (54-88%). These findings 508 
suggest that the Director’s Task could have low reliability, such that task performance appears 509 
to vary quite substantially from study to study. There have also been concerns over the validity 510 
of the Director’s Task as an actual measure of visual perspective taking [49, 50, 51, 52], For 511 
example, it has been proposed that the Director’s Task can be approached using a simple trial 512 
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and error strategy [49]. Indeed, researchers who have used the Director’s Task in the past have, 513 
more recently, questioned whether or not it requires mentalising [52]. As such, we recommend 514 
that future studies should formally evaluate the reliability and validity of the measure before 515 
using it further. 516 
We also note other features of the Director’s Task that are worth further consideration 517 
in future research. Not all studies using the Director’s Task specifically state the number of 518 
trials analysed, so it is possible that accuracy scores vary across studies because of 519 
methodological differences in the way the task was administered. Further, when interpreting 520 
accuracy scores, it is important to note that there are only eight experimental trials; a factor we 521 
did not fully consider when designing the study. Scores of 75% and 87.5% may seem 522 
substantially different, but in this task, the difference is only one error. This does not bode well 523 
for studies such as ours, which aim to improve perspective taking scores through experimental 524 
manipulations or training (in this case, through prosocial priming). There simply is not enough 525 
“room” to measure any true increase in the skill with adult participants. It could be argued that 526 
more trials are needed in the experimental condition, however, given the accuracy rates 527 
returned in our data, participants seem to reach ceiling quickly, rendering the data from those 528 
extra trials superfluous.  529 
A further feature that is worthy of consideration is that the original study using the 530 
Director’s task [30, 31] included a real-life human director who was present in the room and a 531 
real set of shelves. This afforded the researchers the ability to measure quasi-errors whereby 532 
participants reached for an incorrect object but did not necessarily move the wrong object. Our 533 
computerised version of the task did not afford such an opportunity; it only captured actual 534 
errors. One possible solution to this is that users of the task include mouse tracking or eye 535 
tracking measures capable of detecting egocentric ‘quasi-mistakes’ that are made before the 536 
correct item is eventually selected. However, it could be argued that ‘looking’ does not 537 
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constitute a true error.  If one cannot help but locate the object fulfilling the instruction’s criteria 538 
first – the so called ‘curse of knowledge’ [29] – then this may be a necessary step that one 539 
performs before identifying the appropriate item. This fits with a trial and error approach [49] 540 
as, upon identifying the technically correct object, one notes whether or not its shelf has a 541 
backing. If it does, discount it and continue looking. If it does not, select it. Finally, given the 542 
linguistic nature of the task, such concrete instructions as “move the large ball” may render it 543 
impossible to not look at the actual largest ball. In sum, we offer caution to those interested in 544 
studying visual perspective taking using the computerised version of the Director’s Task, 545 
especially if the research question relies on score variability or manipulation.   546 
 547 
Prosocial priming and Automatic Imitation   548 
Previous studies have shown that PS-1st priming leads to increased congruency effects 549 
on automatic imitation tasks [18, 19, 20]. Although the current study had the power to detect 550 
effects smaller than those previously observed, we did not observe an effect. While we did find 551 
a small reaction time difference (6ms) between the PS-1st priming and control groups in the 552 
same direction as previous studies, the difference was not distinguishable from zero. Further, 553 
a Bayesian analysis provided three times more support for the null over the experimental 554 
hypothesis.  555 
Of the four studies included in the meta-analysis, one has a 95% confidence interval 556 
that touches the zero line and two actually cross the line (Fig 9). This is suggestive of an 557 
imprecise estimate of a population effect size, which could be small in size (close to zero) and 558 
paints a different picture to the way in which effects were interpreted by each individual study. 559 
Overall, the pattern of results is in keeping with suggestions in the literature that published 560 
effects are commonly over-estimated [35, 36] and underscores the value of meta-analytic 561 
thinking when aiming to synthesise prior findings [48, 53]. It is more than likely that the actual 562 
effect of prosocial priming on automatic imitation is smaller than previously reported as the 563 
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meta-analysis suggests a population effect size of d=0.43. The meta-analysis also illustrates 564 
the variability of findings to date, with confidence intervals for the standardised effect size 565 
ranging from 0.15 to 0.70. In addition, viewing our null result (d=0.18) within the context of 566 
the meta-analysis (d=0.43) suggests that the effect of first person, prosocial priming on 567 
automatic imitation is indeed prone to variation.   568 
 569 
Limitations and future directions 570 
One potential limitation of the current study is the imitation task used has a spatial 571 
compatibility component, which might introduce ‘noise’ to the data that could interact with the 572 
imitative tendencies of the participants [2, 54, 55]. Although possible, it is unlikely to have 573 
been the reason behind our null results. Prior studies used the same task and were able to show 574 
effects of the same social priming technique on congruency effects [18]. Therefore, while we 575 
do not think it can account for the current null results, separating imitative tendencies from 576 
spatial compatibility would be a useful future direction for research investigating automatic 577 
imitation more generally [54, 56, 57].  578 
 One further limitation concerns the sequencing of tasks. To avoid any influence of the 579 
imitation task on the Director’s Task, we used a fixed order across participants. It is therefore 580 
possible that, by administering the Director’s Task prior to the automatic imitation task, we 581 
unwittingly introduced another prosocial prime that interfered with the effects of the intended 582 
prosocial prime. That is to say, taking someone else’s perspective may itself serve as a prosocial 583 
prime that increases the tendency to imitate. However, if the prosocial prime and the visual 584 
perspective taking task both activated a goal to affiliate, we might still expect to observe overall 585 
greater imitative tendencies in the first person, prosocial group; the effects on behaviour from 586 
both primes might be expected to be additive. This possibility is not supported by the current 587 
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data due to the fact that the control group returned the same congruency effects as the 588 
prosocially primed group.  589 
Conversely, if participants did have a goal to act prosocially, the completion of the 590 
Director’s task could have satisfied this goal and, in essence, ‘switched off’ the prime (see 22 591 
for a review of priming procedures). Again, this explanation could account for the lack of group 592 
differences in the automatic imitation task as all groups could have been returned to baseline. 593 
If this were the case, it would still not encourage thinking of goal priming as a robust method 594 
for increasing prosocial behaviour; as soon as one completes the goal, they return to a neutral 595 
position. Alternatively, the visual perspective taking task could have diluted, or even 596 
overwritten, any effects the prosocial priming task may have generated, which would account 597 
for the lack of group differences. However, with only eight trials among 48 actually requiring 598 
the participant to take someone else’ perspective, the visual perspective taking task would need 599 
to exhibit strong effects to remove those created by the prosocial priming task administered 600 
just five minutes previously.  Ultimately, a future study is required to determine whether the 601 
Director’s Task can function as a prosocial prime that modulates imitative tendencies.  602 
 In summary, the order effect created three possibilities that could in theory account for 603 
this study failing to find the same effect on automatic imitation following prosocial priming as 604 
that found by other studies. Either 1) the goal from priming was satisfied by completing the 605 
Director’s task, 2) the Director’s task exerts effects strong enough to return all groups to 606 
baseline (or equally primed) or 3) the effects of prosocial priming are too weak to survive an 607 
intervening task. While no firm conclusions can be drawn at this moment, when considering 608 
these possibilities and the highly variable effect highlighted by the meta-analysis, it is prudent 609 
to say that the influence of prosocial priming on automatic imitation is unlikely to be robust. 610 
 611 
Conclusion 612 
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Due to an unforeseen ceiling effect in the Director’s Task, we could not evaluate whether 613 
prosocial priming modulates visual perspective taking and this question remains open for future 614 
studies to address. Instead, we suggest that when investigating visual perspective taking using 615 
the Director’s Task, the possibility that the task has low reliability and validity should be given 616 
due consideration and formally tested. The current study also questions the robustness of 617 
prosocial priming effects on automatic imitation. Indeed, meta-analysing all studies to date 618 
suggests that the effects of prosocial primes on imitation are variable and could be small. 619 
Finally, by reporting null results we hope to avoid the file drawer problem and inherent bias in 620 
the published literature [58, 59]. Also, by meta-analysing results as studies emerge [48, 53] and 621 
by making raw data freely available [60], we hope to move towards a more cumulative science 622 
of social cognition that future studies can build upon. 623 
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